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THE NEXT GENERATION COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT

ORIN S. KERR†

In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) to regulate government access to Internet communications and
records. ECPA is widely regarded as outdated, and ECPA reform is now on
the Congressional agenda. At the same time, existing reform proposals retain
the structure of the 1986 Act and merely tinker with a few small aspects of
the statute. This Article offers a thought experiment about what might
happen if Congress were to repeal ECPA and enact a new privacy statute to
replace it.
The new statute would look quite different from ECPA because
overlooked changes in Internet technology have dramatically altered the
assumptions on which the 1986 Act was based. ECPA was designed for a
network world with high storage costs and only local network access. Its
design reflects the privacy threats of such a network, including high privacy
protection for real-time wiretapping, little protection for noncontent records,
and no attention to particularity or jurisdiction. Today’s Internet reverses all
of these assumptions. Storage costs have plummeted, leading to a reality of
almost total storage. Even U.S.-based services now serve a predominantly
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foreign customer base. A new statute would need to account for these
changes.
This Article contends that a next generation privacy act should contain
four features. First, it should impose the same requirement on access to all
contents. Second, it should impose particularity requirements on the scope of
disclosed metadata. Third, it should impose minimization rules on all
accessed content. And fourth, it should impose a two-part territoriality
regime with a mandatory rule structure for U.S.-based users and a
permissive regime for users located abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) to govern the privacy of computer network communications.1 The
Act grants Internet users a set of statutory privacy rights that limits the
government’s power to access a person’s communications and records.2
ECPA has governed Internet privacy in the U.S. for over a quarter century
with only minor revisions.3
In recent years, ECPA has become widely perceived as outdated.4 Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
recently announced that ECPA reform is now a “top priority.”5 His counterpart on the House side, Representative Robert Goodlatte, chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, has also endorsed the need to reform
ECPA and recently held hearings on ECPA reform.6
Despite the congressional interest in ECPA reform, existing reform
proposals mostly nibble at the edges of the 1986 statute.7 Those proposals
accept the basic structure of ECPA as fixed, and they aim to tweak privacy
protections within the Act’s framework. This Article considers a thought
experiment: What would the electronic communications privacy laws
ideally look like if Congress could start from scratch and enact an entirely
new law?
1 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2 See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 4.5–4.8(e) (3d ed.
2007).
3 The major changes to ECPA following 1986 are discussed infra Section I.C.
4 See Charlie Savage, Panel Approves a Bill to Safeguard Email, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, at
B7 (noting that ECPA “is widely seen as outdated”); see also Brendan Sasso, Consensus Builds for
Requiring Warrant for Email Searches, HILL’S HILLICON VALLEY (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/289035-consensus-builds-for-requiringwarrant-for-email-searches (quoting Representative Jim Sensenbrenner as saying that ECPA’s
requirement of only a subpoena for access to email records is “outdated and probably unconstitutional”).
5 Brendan Sasso & Jennifer Martinez, OVERNIGHT TECH: House to Consider Email Privacy
Bill, THE HILL’S HILLICON VALLEY ( F eb. 27, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/285397-overnight-tech-house-to-consider-email-privacy-bill; see also Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., The Agenda of the Senate Judiciary Committee
for the 113th Congress ( J an. 16, 2013), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/113-sjcagenda-speech (“[A]s Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I will keep pushing to update our
privacy laws to address emerging technology and the Internet, including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and cybersecurity laws.”).
6 See Sasso & Martinez, supra note 5 (reporting House Judiciary Committee Chairman Robert Goodlatte’s commitment to “look at modernizing the decades-old Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) to reflect our current digital economy”).
7 See infra Section I.D.
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The Article contends that such a new privacy act would look quite
different from the current ECPA. Network technologies have dramatically
transformed since the 1980s. The extraordinary pace of technological change
in the last quarter century means that the Internet of today bears only a
slight resemblance to the Internet of the 1980s. Indeed, today’s Internet is
quite different from the Internet of a decade ago, often in ways that are
imperceptible to the user but that have profound implications for privacy
law. If Congress could start fresh and enact a new statute, those changes
would lead to a law very different from ECPA statute on the books today.
Two technological changes are particularly important. First, the plummeting costs of storage have changed how surveillance threatens privacy.8
ECPA was drafted at a time when electronic storage was expensive and
therefore relatively rare. Accordingly, ECPA treated real-time wiretapping
as the chief privacy threat. Access to stored communications was a lesser
concern. The opposite is true today. Storage has become remarkably cheap
and therefore ubiquitous. Service providers now routinely store everything,
and they can turn over everything to law enforcement. As a result of this
technological change, access to stored records has become the greater
privacy threat. The incredible growth of stored records renders ECPA’s
structure exactly backwards for the operation of modern computer networks.
Second, the Internet has become truly global.9 ECPA was drafted when
computer network usage was very heavily U.S.-based. The Act created
statutory protections for U.S. users of U.S. services. Today’s network usage
looks dramatically different: only about ten percent of the today’s global
Internet usage involves U.S.-based individuals. 10 The overwhelming
majority of users of Internet services such as Gmail and Facebook are based
abroad.11 The global nature of today’s Internet creates a series of jurisdictional headaches for global Internet services that might have corporate
headquarters in one country, servers in another, and users all around the
world.
More than just technology has changed: new principles of constitutional
law have emerged that alter the proper role of statutory law. In the last five
years, courts have begun to settle the basic parameters of how the Fourth
Amendment applies to the Internet.12 The original ECPA was designed as a
8 See infra Section II.A.
9 See infra Section II.E.
10 See infra Section II.E.
11 See infra Section II.E.
12 See infra Section II.C.
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statutory stand-in for uncertain Fourth Amendment protection. As the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection becomes more certain, however,
the statute’s coverage may change with it.
As a practical matter, lawmakers rarely start from scratch when passing
legislation. Amending prior laws is the norm for a variety of reasons. But if
Congress were forced to enact a new privacy act, that new law ideally would
be based on four principles. First, the new statute would impose a uniform
warrant requirement for compelled access to contents held for a customer or
subscriber.13 The new statute would abolish ECPA’s antiquated distinctions,
such as the difference between real-time access and stored access and the
complex categories of coverage of the Stored Communications Act. In place
of those distinctions, the new statute would treat all access to contents
under the same warrant standard.
Second, the law would enact a particularity requirement for compelled
access to noncontent information. 14 One approach might rely on the
concept of customer-hours. When the government obtains a court order to
compel records, it should not be entitled to all of a user’s records—or even
worse, all records of hundreds of users. Instead, each court order could be
limited based on both the time coverage of the order and the number of
users implicated. If the government seeks records associated with many
users, it must accept the tradeoff that those records will span a shorter
window of time.
Third, the new law would impose minimization limitations for contents
of communications obtained by government investigators. 15 When the
government collects the contents of communications pursuant to a court
order, investigators should be limited in what they can access. ECPA only
imposes such limits for contents obtained by real-time wiretapping, reflecting the traditional sense that real-time access poses the greatest privacy
threat. The functional collapse of the distinction between real-time and
stored access means that those limits should now apply to all contents.
Fourth, a new law would adopt an explicit territoriality regime.16 One
solution would be to focus on the location of the user, with full warrant
protections for users based in the United States and a permissive disclosure
regime to foreign legal process for users based abroad. A global network
demands different protections for local and foreign users. Under my
proposal, U.S. users would receive full warrant protection regardless of the
13
14
15
16

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
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location of servers or corporate headquarters. By contrast, U.S. providers
should be permitted, but not required, to disclose records pursuant to
foreign legal processes for users based in the country seeking those records.
The argument will proceed in three parts. Part I introduces the history
and structure of ECPA. This Part explores the computer technology that
existed when ECPA was passed and explains how ECPA evolved in response to that technology. Part II explains why the existing statute is based
on outdated assumptions. Changing technology and evolving constitutional
law have dramatically shifted the factual and legal ground on which ECPA
was based. Part III identifies the four major principles on which a next
generation privacy act could be based. It points the way to new principles
based on existing network technology.
I. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ECPA
It is difficult to analyze ECPA without first understanding early Internet technology. This Part begins by explaining surveillance law before
ECPA. It then turns to the new technological problems that ECPA was
designed to address at the time of its enactment, and it explains the basic
structure of ECPA to see how it responded to these problems. This Part
concludes by highlighting the limited nature of existing ECPA reform
proposals and focusing on reforms advocated by an influential group known
as the Digital Due Process Coalition.
A. Federal Surveillance Law Before ECPA
Early federal surveillance laws began as efforts to regulate telephone
privacy. The telephone was invented by 1880, 17 and it proved to be a
dramatic advance over communication by telegraph. But the telephone had
a serious privacy flaw. Any person with access to the physical wires carrying
the call could tap into the wire and intercept the call. In the early days of
the telephone, wiretapping was rampant. 18 Some state laws prohibiting

17 See Christopher Beauchamp, Who Invented the Telephone? Lawyers, Patents, and the Judgments of History, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 854, 855-67 (2010) (noting that patent litigation surrounding the telephone’s origins clouds the question of who invented the telephone).
18 See SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 25-34 (1959) (tracing phone wiretapping back to the 1890s and highlighting its growth as a practice into the 1950s); see also Heutsche
v. United States, 414 U.S. 898, 899 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ( “[W]e live in a regime where
the ‘dirty business' of wiretapping runs rampant.”).
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wiretapping emerged by 1895,19 although the first federal statute did not
arrive until the Communications Act of 1934.20 Telephone privacy laws
naturally focused on the act of “intercepting” the call—that is, breaking in
on the private call by installing a listening device to monitor the communication over the wires as the call was transmitted.21
Congress maintained the focus on interception when it enacted the
Wiretap Act in 1968.22 The Wiretap Act replaced the Communications Act
of 1934 as the federal statute governing privacy in telephone communications. Like the Communications Act, the Wiretap Act prohibits “intercepting” telephone calls between parties to a communication. 23 Unlike the
Communications Act, however, the Wiretap Act includes a carefully crafted
privacy regime regulating lawful interceptions.24 That privacy regime was
inspired in part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York,
which required any wiretapping statute to include special privacy protections against government monitoring.25 Wiretapping raised special Fourth
Amendment concerns, Berger had indicated, because it involved “a series of
intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable
cause,”26 rather than the “one limited intrusion” of a traditional search into
physical property.27 Put another way, real-time wiretapping was contemporaneous with transmission and therefore could collect all information sent
over the wire. In contrast, a traditional search was a limited intrusion into a
space to collect only what had been stored there.
Echoing Berger, the Wiretap Act imposes a stringent warrant requirement for intercepting telephone calls over the wires. Interception orders can
19 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46 (1967) (highlighting an 1895 Illinois law outlawing wiretapping and similar legislation enacted ten years later in California).
20 Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–609 (1934)).
21 For example, the relevant provision of the Communications Act of 1934 stated that “[n]o
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person.” Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1104 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1934)).
22 The Wiretap Act is sometimes referred to as “Title III” because it was passed as the third
title of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(1968). The Wiretap Act is codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006) (stating that anyone who “[i]ntentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication” commits a crime).
24 See id. § 2511(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (identifying exceptions when wiretapping is lawful
without a court order); id. § 2518 (identifying procedures for lawful interception pursuant to a
court order).
25 388 U.S. 41, 57-60 (1967).
26 Id. at 59.
27 Id. at 57.
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be obtained to conduct government monitoring, but they require a showing
of special need, a predicate felony offense, and high-level Justice Department or state approval.28 The Wiretap Act also includes two special rules
for how the government must execute a wiretap. First, the government
must engage in minimization.29 Minimization refers to the process of trying
to limit ex ante which of a suspect’s communications the government will
intercept.30 If an agent is listening to a wiretapped telephone line, the agent
might engage in minimization by not listening in when the suspect speaks
with his mother about her health problems.31
The second requirement is a general ban on disclosure of communications intercepted or information learned from those communications unless
appropriate to the investigation. 32 Agents are not permitted to disclose
information obtained from intercepted communications—even to other
agents—unless it “is appropriate to the proper performance of the official
duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.”33 The idea is to
treat even lawfully intercepted communications as private: the government
must justify each use and disclosure of information, even within the government.34
B. The Office of Technology Assessment Report and the Need for ECPA
By the mid-1980s, Congress grew concerned about new computer telecommunications methods that fell outside the scope of existing privacy
laws. In 1985, the now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
published an influential report entitled Federal Government Information

28
29

18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2006).
See id. § 2518(5) (stating that a wiretapping order “shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception”); see also
LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 2, § 4.6(h), at 496-97 (requiring the minimization of nonrelevant
communications under the Wiretap Act).
30 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.6(h), at 497 (discussing how the minimization requirement “does not forbid [the] interception” of “nonpertinent communications,” but requires
the government to take measures to lessen their interception).
31 See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1978) (concluding that conversations
between the defendant and her mother were reasonably intercepted by government agents); see
also United States v. Glover, 681 F.3d 411, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that “determining the
reasonableness of minimization efforts is a fact-specific inquiry”).
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2006).
33 Id. § 2517(1).
34 See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that, with respect to
material gathered from wiretapped investigations, “the USAO [United States Attorney’s Office]
may not be authorized to provide these materials to [another] civil enforcement agency”).
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Technology: Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties.35 The report noted the
growth of communications sent over computers—specifically the advent of
“electronic mail.”36 At that time, electronic mail took two forms. First, users
could send messages that were then printed out and delivered in hard copy
format either by the postal service or by a courier.37 Second, users could
send computer-to-computer messages over the telephone lines. 38 This
generally required use of a modem to access mainframe computers, which
would allow users to send a message over telephone lines to a “central
computer” where the message would wait for the recipient to access and
download it.39
Computer data transmissions and electronic mail raised several new
problems not addressed by the Wiretap Act. First, the Act was largely
telephone-specific.40 The interception of computer data transmissions was
not prohibited by the Wiretap Act because it only protected data transmissions that contained the sound of a human voice.41 Data communications
were not protected. This issue arose in the very first federal computer crime
case when a hacker objected to being monitored using the network he had
successfully invaded.42 The Fourth Circuit held that such monitoring could
not violate the Wiretap Act for several reasons, one of which was that

35 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1985), available at
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8509.pdf [hereinafter “OTA REPORT”].
36 Notably, the issue of email privacy dominated the OTA REPORT’s concerns about computer privacy. The Report briefly noted that computer users also could access Electronic Bulletin
Boards, but even these were described as a form of email:

An electronic bulletin board is an electronic mail service (or the equivalent computer-based information service) with a public or private electronic mailbox that is accessible to several persons. A public bulletin board usually is open to many or all
subscribers and/or persons with a general password. A private bulletin board is limited to persons with special passwords.
Id. at 48.
37 Id. at 47-48.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 48.
40 The Wiretap Act also prohibits the interception of “oral communications,” which effectively prohibits the use of secret audio recording devices to record the human voice. 18 U.S.C §
2511(1)(a) (2006); see also id. § 2510(2) (2006) (defining “oral communication”). The oral communication aspects of the Wiretap Act, however, are not implicated by the issues raised in this Article.
41 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 36 (noting that while courts had yet to rule on the
matter, Title III applied to all phone conversations, regardless of whether they were in digital or
analog form).
42 United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978).
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computer transmissions did not contain sounds and therefore were not
protected by statutory law.43
Second, the Wiretap Act only applied to real-time interception instead
of access to stored communications. 44 This made sense with ephemeral
telephone calls because the only way to access a phone call was to listen in
real-time as the call occurred. However, electronic mail was stored at
various places in the course of delivery, and accessing a stored communication was not an “interception” because it was not contemporaneous with the
communication’s transmission.45 As a result, the Wiretap Act did not offer
any protection against government access to stored email.46 Although the
OTA Report noted that the Fourth Amendment might protect individuals
against government access to their stored emails,47 the possible scope of
Fourth Amendment protection was uncertain. Any protection might not
apply to backup copies held by “electronic mail companies,”48 which the
government could access.
C. The Enactment of ECPA and Its Major Amendments
In 1986, just one year after the OTA Report, Congress enacted ECPA
to provide privacy protections for new uses of computer technologies.49
ECPA contains three parts. The first part expands the Wiretap Act so that
its prohibition on interception extends to computer data
transmissions in addition to telephone calls.50 Another part of the statute
adds protections against the use of pen registers, which are tools used to
monitor the numbers dialed from a person’s telephone.51 Sometimes known
43
44

Id. at 157.
At the time, the leading precedent on this point was United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654
(5th Cir. 1976).
45 Id. at 658-59 (holding that Congress did not intend to protect against intrusions into an
individual’s email communications under the Wiretap Act).
46 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 48-52 (analyzing the different stages of the electronic
communications process and suggesting various policy options open to Congress in legislating
government access to electronic mail).
47 Id. at 49-50 (explaining that electronic communications which had been printed out and
mailed “would receive the same protections that are accorded first class mail”).
48 Id. at 50 (“[I]t is possible that an individual would not have a legal basis from which to
challenge an electronic mail company’s disclosure of the contents of messages or records of
messages sent.”).
49 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
50 This amendment was Title I of ECPA, and it amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006).
51 This amendment was Title III of ECPA, and it was codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27
(2006).
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as the Pen Register Statute, this portion of ECPA makes it unlawful to
install a monitoring device to record telephone numbers unless the government first obtains a court order or the phone company records the numbers
for business purposes.52
But the most complex part of the new statute, and the part that has become by far the most important, is the section known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA).53 The SCA creates statutory privacy rights for
“subscribers or customers” of two kinds of Internet services.54 The first kind
of Internet service protected by the statute is the one most relevant to
individual users. The statute creates privacy protections in email services,
referred to in the statute as “electronic communications service” (ECS)
providers.55 The second kind of Internet service protected by the statute
was (at least at the time) of primary interest to businesses. Businesses such
as hospitals and banks often outsourced storage and processing services to
commercial services.56 This was true because computer storage was very
expensive, and business software such as spreadsheet programs had not been
invented. Congress opted to create statutory privacy protections for the
customers of these commercial services, referred to in the statute as providers of “remote computing services” (RCS).57
The statute then creates two kinds of protections for customers of the
two covered providers. First, it creates legal rules for when the government
can compel providers to disclose records about customers and subscribers;
second, it creates legal rules for when the providers can disclose records
voluntarily.58 Significantly, the rules for both compelling and voluntarily
disclosing records act as an on–off switch: where any category of records can
be disclosed, all records held by the provider can be disclosed.59 To put the
point in language from the Fourth Amendment context, the statute imposes
no limits on particularity: there is no need to be specific as to which emails,

52 Id. For a helpful discussion of the Pen Register Statute, see In re Order Authorizing Installation of Pen Register, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1558-61 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
53 The Stored Communications Act was enacted as Title II of ECPA, and it is codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2006).
54 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
55 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006).
56 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10-11 (1986).
57 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (2006).
58 In the current version of the statute, the rules on compelled disclosure are found in 18
U.S.C. § 2703, while the rules on voluntary disclosure are found in 18 U.S.C. § 2702.
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (2006) (allowing a provider to “divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber”).
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which files, or which records were obtained. Instead, disclosure of one
record allows disclosure of all records.60
Unlike the Wiretap Act of 1968, the SCA of 1986 is notable for imposing no minimization requirement.61 Under the Wiretap Act, lawful access to
communications comes with strings attached. Even after obtaining a lawful
wiretap order, agents are required to screen communications ex ante.62 No
such limitations were imposed under the SCA. Under the SCA, a court
order requires the provider to provide the government with the entire
contents of the account.63 The government is then free to look through all
of it, with no limits on the government’s power to use communications it
finds, whether relevant or not to the crime under investigation.64
In any communications network, a fundamental distinction exists between the actual message to be sent over the network and information on
the network that relates to the how, when, and where of the message. The
former is the content of the communication; the latter are noncontent
records known as metadata or envelope information.65 In the context of
Internet communications, the contents include the actual messages in
emails, together with their subject lines, as well as the contents of files
stored on the network.66 In contrast, the metadata includes IP addresses,
to– from information on emails, login times, and locations.67 As enacted in
its original form, the SCA focused its attention on contents held by providers of ECS and RCS instead of noncontent information. Unopened emails
stored for less than 180 days received the full protection of a warrant.68
Opened emails and remotely stored files held by providers of RCS received
less protection. 69 But protections for noncontent information were the

60
61

Id.
See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264, 1298 (2004) (arguing that the SCA along with the Pen Register Act fell short of requiring
minimization procedures among other privacy protections).
62 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (2006) (holding that agents may be required to give progress
reports to a court).
63 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006).
64 Id.
65 For postal letters, the difference is the letter versus the outside of the envelope.
66 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 611-13 (2003) (discussing the distinction between content and
envelope information across different technologies).
67 Id. at 614.
68 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1988).
69 Id. § 2703(b) (1988).
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weakest protections in the statute and appear to be added almost as an
afterthought.70
Although the basic structure of the 1986 statute remains in place today,
two subsequent amendments are worth noting. First, in 1994, Congress
bolstered the privacy protections for some kinds of noncontent information. 71 Under the 1994 Amendment, the government must establish
“specific and articulable facts” to obtain a court order requiring the disclosure of many kinds of noncontent Internet records, such as the to–from
addresses on emails.72 This amendment reflects the reasonable suspicion
threshold familiar to students of Fourth Amendment law. 73 Congress
codified the section that provides for this order at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), and
as a result the court orders are known colloquially as “2703(d) orders.”74
Second, as part of the Patriot Act in 2001, Congress amended the pen
register provisions of ECPA to clarify that they apply to Internet communications as well as telephone calls.75 The 1986 text of the pen register
provisions of ECPA was largely telephone-specific. 76 It prohibited the
installation of devices to record telephone numbers dialed absent a court
order.77 At the same time, the 1986 text left unclear whether the statute only
provided privacy protections for numbers dialed in telephone calls or if the
protections also applied to the real-time acquisition of noncontent records
relating to Internet communications.78 The Patriot Act clarified that the pen
register sections of ECPA apply to the Internet by redefining terms such as
“pen register” to include all “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information” relating to any telecommunications network.79 As a result, the
pen register provisions of ECPA now extend to government surveillance of
70 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (1988) (highlighting lower requirements for government
access to records like payment information, names, and addresses from remote computing
services).
71 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279
(1994).
72 Id.
73 See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the ‘specific
and articulable facts’ standard [in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)] derives from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Terry”).
74 See LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 4.8(c) (“The court order found in § 2703(d) is often referred to as a ‘2703(d)’ order or simply a ‘d’ order.”).
75 Kerr, Internetsupra note 66, at 639.
76 Id. at 626.
77 From 1986 to 2001, a “pen register” was defined by the statute as “a device which records
or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1988).
78 See Kerr, Internetsupra note 66, at 634 (noting that while the text was unclear, law enforcement practice consistently applied the sections to the Internet).
79 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
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noncontent addressing information, such as Internet Protocol addresses and
the to–from information for email communications.80
The ECPA that emerges from the original 1986 statute and its major
amendments is premised on a series of dichotomies. Knowing how the
statute regulates a particular kind of privacy-invading action requires
classifying the action based on the statute’s distinctions. For example, is the
surveillance occurring in real-time (prospectively), or does it involve access
to stored records (retrospectively)? The Wiretap Act and Pen Register
provisions of ECPA apply in the former case, while the Stored Communications Act provisions apply in the latter case. Does the conduct involve
access to contents of communications, or does it involve access to noncontent envelope information? The former are regulated by the Wiretap Act
and parts of the Stored Communications Act, while the latter are regulated
by the Pen Register provisions and different parts of the Stored Communications Act. Are the communications held by a remote computing service or
electronic communications service? Is the disclosure voluntary or compelled? Again, the answer points the reader to a different section of the
statute, which involves different protections.
D. The Current Criticisms of ECPA—and Their Limits
ECPA was an impressive achievement in its day. A quarter century later, however, it has become commonplace to recognize that ECPA is outdated.81 But although the need to update ECPA is widely recognized, existing
criticisms of the statute and current reform proposals tend to tinker around
the edges of the statute. The proposals retain the basic structure of the
statute and only “update” a few sections within it.
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the limited nature of existing criticism is to examine the reform proposals recently advocated by a large and
influential set of civil liberties groups, Internet companies, and privacy
scholars known as the Digital Due Process Coalition.82 The group includes
nonprofit organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, as well as major Internet businesses,
including Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, and AT&T. 83
80
81
82

Id.
Savage, supra note 4.
The corporate members of the group include a virtual “who’s who” of the Internet world.
Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=
DF652CE0-2552-11DF-B455000C296BA163 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
83 Id.
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Understanding the Coalition’s four principles provides a helpful illustration
of the limited ambitions of existing ECPA reform proposals.
The first proposal of the Digital Due Process Coalition would impose a
warrant requirement for compelled government access to stored contents of
communications held by a provider of ECS or RCS.84 Some background
may be helpful to understand this proposal. The SCA imposes a warrant
requirement in some cases but not in others. On one hand, the government
needs a warrant to compel the release of communications content held by a
provider of ECS for up to 180 days.85 On the other hand, the government
does not need a warrant to compel the release of contents held by a provider
of ECS for more than 180 days or held by a provider of RCS.86
Under this framework, the SCA offers less protection than a warrant to
regulate government access to many remotely stored personal files. For
example, old emails are no longer fully protected under the ECS rules.87
Additionally, because individuals often use third party Internet storage
services that count under the RCS rules—for example, Google Drive88 and
other cloud storage services—many of their personal files are protected by
less process than a warrant under the RCS rules as well. The first proposal
of the Digital Due Process Coalition would replace that patchwork of
protections with a simple warrant requirement for all contents held by a
provider of RCS or ECS for any length of time.
The second Coalition proposal would require a warrant whenever the
government compels ECS or RCS providers to disclose location information

84

The Coalition’s website explains this proposal in detail:
A governmental entity may require an entity covered by ECPA (a provider of wire
or electronic communication service or a provider of remote computing service) to
disclose communications that are not readily accessible to the public only with a
search warrant issued based on a showing of probable cause, regardless of the age of
the communications, the means or status of their storage or the provider’s access to
or use of the communications in its normal business operations.

Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION,
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163 (last
visited Nov. 22, 2013).
85 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
86 Id. § 2703(b).
87 This may be true for two reasons. First, the email may be in electronic storage for more
than 180 days, and thus may be covered under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). Alternatively, some courts
have held that opened email that is stored on a server is held in the provider’s capacity as a remote
computing service, and thus becomes covered under § 2703(b) immediately after it is opened and
the copy is stored. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012).
88 See generally About Google Drive, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/drive/about.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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for mobile devices such as cellular phones.89 Mobile devices create location
records because device providers need to know where the devices are
located to route communications to and from them. Cellular phones did
exist when ECPA was first drafted; however, the statute did not include any
special rules to govern access to records relating to their use. Instead, the
current statute treats mobile location information like other noncontent
records. Under the SCA, retrospective government access to stored location
information generally requires a 2703(d) order.90 However, because ECPA
does not provide for prospective access to location information, 91 the
government generally must obtain a warrant under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to obtain ongoing access in “real-time” to such location
information.92 The Coalition proposal would extend the statutory warrant
requirement to retrospective collection of stored location information.
The third Coalition proposal is to raise the statutory threshold for pen
register information.93 Under the pen register provisions of ECPA, the
government can obtain an order to collect noncontent addressing information in real-time with a mere certification that the information to be
collected is believed to be relevant to an ongoing investigation. 94 No
showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required, and the judge
89 See Our Principles, supra note 84. (“A governmental entity may access, or may require a
covered entity to provide, prospectively or retrospectively, location information regarding a
mobile communications device only with a warrant issued based on a showing of probable
cause.”).
90 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
91 The Pen Register statute might be thought to regulate prospective access to location information, but Congress indicated a contrary intent in a section of the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006) (“[W]ith regard to
information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices
(as defined in section 3127 of title 18), such call-identifying information shall not include any
information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.”).
92 Lower courts are not uniform on this point, but it is the majority view and, in my view,
the correct one. See generally In re Application of U.S. For & Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a
Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; and
(3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577-78 (W.D. Tex.
2010).
93 According to the group’s proposal,

A governmental entity may access, or may require a covered entity to provide, prospectively or in real-timereal-timereal-time, dialed number information, email to and
from information or other data currently covered by the authority for pen registers
and trap and trace devices only after judicial review and a court finding that the governmental entity has made a showing at least as strong as the showing under 2703(d).
Our Principles, supra note 84.
94 18 U.S.C. § 3122(2)(b)(2) (2006).
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does not make an independent determination of the facts. The Coalition
proposal would require that the government “at least” satisfies the reasonable suspicion standard of a 2703(d) order prior to compelling pen register
information.
The final Coalition proposal would limit the government’s power to
subpoena account information for multiple individuals or accounts.95 ECPA
permits the government to compel a limited set of information about
accounts with a mere subpoena, such as a subscriber’s name and address (if
known), records of session times and durations, and IP addresses.96 The
Coalition would maintain this power but clarify that multiple subpoenas are
needed for multiple accounts unless the government establishes some sort
of cause for multi-account orders.
The four proposals of the Digital Due Process Coalition provide a helpful sense of the kinds of ECPA reform proposals that have been made in
recent years, both in the academic scholarship and in Congressional bills.
Nevertheless, it is striking how much the Coalition’s proposals accept the
basic structure of the 1986 statute. They accept the existing coverage of the
Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, and Pen Register statute. They
accept the existing distinction between real-time and stored access, the
distinction between content and noncontent, and the existing definition of
ECS and RCS. Three of the four proposals focus on a single narrow
question: the thresholds of cause that the government must satisfy to
compel information from a provider in various contexts.
To be clear, I agree with some of the Coalition’s proposals.97 But whether one agrees or disagrees with them, the existing proposals work within
ECPA’s outdated framework. The remainder of this Article takes a different
approach. Instead of asking how existing laws might be amended, it imagines what Congress should do if it were to start from scratch. Internet
technology and Fourth Amendment law is far from where they were in the

95 See Our Principles, supra note 84 (“Where the Stored Communications Act authorizes a
subpoena to acquire information, a governmental entity may use such subpoenas only for
information related to a specified account(s) or individual(s). All non-particularized requests must
be subject to judicial approval.”).
96 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
97 For example, I advocated the Coalition’s third proposal in a 2003 article. See Kerr, Internetsupra note 66, at 643 (“I agree with civil libertarian critics who believe that the pen register
standard should be raised.”). I have also testified about the Digital Due Process Coalition
principles before the House Judiciary Committee. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33-42 (2010) (Statement of Orin S. Kerr) (highlighting some of
the criticisms of the Coalition’s principles presented in this Article).
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1980s, and those changes suggest that starting with a clean slate would bring
Congress to enact a very different statute. The next Part shows why.
II. HOW CHANGING LAW AND TECHNOLOGY RENDER
ECPA OUTDATED
This Section explains how current technology and constitutional law
have rendered the dichotomies of ECPA outdated. ECPA is premised on a
series of dichotomies created by the original 1986 Act. Several of the
dichotomies are explicit, including real-time access versus stored access,
ECS versus RCS, and content versus noncontent. Others are implicit in the
statute, such as the territorial scope of the statute and the particularity of
court orders. ECPA’s distinctions made sense in a world in which few
records were created, few records were stored, and therefore, few records
could be obtained. The statutory structure presumes an absence of Fourth
Amendment protection, and it also presumes a world of users and providers
inside the United States.
Today’s network is very different. We have entered a world of almost
total storage, in which providers and many users can—and often do—store
everything. The Internet has become truly global, with many prominent
U.S.-based Internet services serving a predominantly foreign customer
base. Additionally, Fourth Amendment protections are becoming established in ways that may soon outpace statutory standards. The old categories no longer work, indicating a need for new categories that should form
the basis of a next generation privacy act. This Part explains how the major
distinctions of ECPA have become obsolete. It shines a light on the network technology of the present, revealing some surprising ways that the
existing ECPA statute has become badly outdated.
A. Real-time Versus Stored Access
The first fundamental dichotomy in ECPA is the distinction between
real-time surveillance and access to stored records. Real-time surveillance is
covered by the Wiretap Act and Pen Register statute; access to stored
records is covered by the SCA. The statutory distinction between prospective and retrospective surveillance emerged for largely historical reasons.
The telephone network predated the Internet, and telephone surveillance
was necessarily real time. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Berger v. New
York indicated that real-time wiretapping raised special privacy concerns:
“continuous surveillance” raised the prospect that the government would
need to monitor a great deal of unrelated private communications over time
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in order to find the small subset of communications related to criminal
activity.98 In contrast, access to stored communications raised much less of a
concern, as relatively few communications were retained and therefore
stored. As a result, real-time wiretapping required more privacy protections
than stored access.
That distinction made sense when Congress enacted ECPA. In the
1980s, remote computer storage was very expensive.99 Internet services of
that time were designed to limit storage. After a user read his email from a
server, for example, the email typically was downloaded to the user’s
computer and deleted from the server to save space.100 Back when remote
storage was expensive, the difference between real time and stored access
was important. Few sent communications were saved: Real time access
raised special concerns that stored access did not. For that reason, Congress
created special restrictions such as minimization on real-time data collection.101 The government had to carefully limit what information it accessed
and then limit what it disclosed. No similar protections were written into
the SCA.102
Today, however, the distinction between stored and real-time surveillance has blurred. Storage has become extremely cheap. Computer storage
costs have dropped by a factor of ten roughly every four years for the last
thirty years.103 The cost of storing a single gigabyte of data has dropped
from about eighty-five thousand dollars in 1984 to about five cents in
2011.104 As the cost of storage drops, Internet services offer the capacity to
store everything cheaply. Storage has become the norm. And as storage has
become cheap, the norm among users has changed along with it. Users no
longer need to be careful about what they keep on the server. The server
can keep everything.

98
99

388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
See R.J.T. Morris & B.J. Truskowsi, The Evolution of Storage Systems, 42 IBM SYS. J. 205,
205-06 (2003) (examining the evolution of data storage systems and their costs).
100 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 47 (noting that emails sent over teletext could be
saved or deleted by the receiving terminal after they had been viewed).
101 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006) (extending the minimization requirements of the Wiretap Act from telephone to data transmissions).
102 Solove, supra note 61, at 1298.
103 John Villasenor, Recording Everything: Digital Storage as an Enabler of Authoritarian Gov3
(Dec.
14,
2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/
ernments,
BROOKINGS INST.
media/research/files/papers/2011/12/14%20digital%20storage%20villasenor/1214_digital_storage_
villasenor.pdf.
104 Id.; see also Morris & Truskowsi, supra note 99, at 206 (noting that since 1997 raw storage
prices have been declining at 50-60% per year).
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To appreciate the difference, consider the storage space available to users of free web-based email services. When free email services became
popular in the mid to late 1990s, they generally came with about 2 megabytes of storage space.105 In contrast, today’s popular free Gmail service
comes with fifteen gigabytes (GB) of storage space, about seventy-five
hundred times more storage than was common a decade ago.106 And it is
taken for granted that the space that comes with free email services will
only continue to increase.107
Many readers will appreciate how the difference has changed their approach to email storage. A decade ago, it was commonplace for users to
delete many stored communications to save space. Today the norm has
flipped. The commonplace reaction is to store everything and simply search
through data later to find what the user needs. The statistics bear this out.
According to one recent report, a typical Gmail user stores more than
seventeen thousand emails in her account at any given time.108 Almost
twelve thousand of those emails are received and stored in the inbox; almost
six thousand are sent emails directed elsewhere.109
The drop in storage costs has led to a shift in the practices of Internet
providers. Today’s Internet providers can—and often do—store everything.
The Boston Police Department revealed a fascinating example in 2009
when it released documents investigators had collected pursuant to ECPA
to solve the case of the so-called “Craigslist Killer,” Philip Markoff. 110
Among the documents was a report the police had obtained from Facebook
containing the stored contents of Markoff’s Facebook account. The 72-page
105 See Paul Festa, Google to Offer Gigabyte of Free Email, CNET NEWS (Apr. 1, 2004),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1032-5182805.html (highlighting how Gmail’s jump to one gigabyte of
storage dwarfed previous storage limits of email providers).
106 Nathan Ingraham, Google Unifies Gmail, Drive, and Photo Storage: All Users Now Get 15GB
of
Shared
Space,
VERGE
(May
13,
2013),
http://www.theverge.com/
2013/5/13/4326994/google-unifies-gmail-photo-and-drive-storage.
107 Indeed, the amount of space provided to Gmail users rose from 10GB to 15GB in between
drafts of this Article. See Chris Ziegler, Gmail Bumps Free Storage to 10GB, VERGE (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.theverge.com/2012/4/24/2971885/gmail-bumps-free-storage-to-10gb (reporting on the
increase to 10GB and predicting that, “as always,” the amount of free storage will continue to
“creep up over time”).
108 Mike Barton, How Much Is Your Gmail Account Worth?, WIRED ( J uly 25, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/insights/2012/07/gmail-account-worth.
109 Id.
110 See Carly Carioli, When the Cops Subpoena Your Facebook Information, Here’s What Facebook
(Apr.
6,
2012),
http://blog.thephoenix.com/
Sends
the
Cops,
PHOENIX
blogs/phlog/archive/2012/04/06/when-police-subpoena-your-facebook-information-heres-whatfacebook-sends-cops.aspx (noting, among other things, how Facebook reveals little of its
involvement in subpoenas from investigators or how many the site serves).
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report contained more than just the messages, friends lists, and pictures that
we might think of as the contents of a Facebook account.111 It also contained
every comment Markoff had posted and all of the deleted pictures and
deleted friends he once had but then tried to erase. More remarkably, it also
contained records of every single click that Markoff had made while using
Facebook. Every visit to every page, every viewing of every picture, and
every click on every link was documented with a specific entry in a log
file.112 Facebook had recorded it all.
As these examples suggest, the drop in the price of storage has caused an
unappreciated sea change in the practical implication of access to stored
communications. The default has switched from store-only-importantrecords to store-it-all. Granted, Facebook does not store everything only
because it is cheap. Facebook’s business model depends on being able to sell
targeted advertisements based on what users do, which requires close
monitoring of what they do.113 But the low cost of storage makes that
possible.
The change has enormous implications for Internet surveillance law.
When everything is stored, stored access begins to reveal the same level of
detail as real-time access. The difference between real-time surveillance and
stored access evaporates. If anything, stored access is even more revealing
and invasive. Real-time surveillance is cabined by time. For example, thirty
days of real-time surveillance can only reveal communications over the
thirty-day period. In contrast, one time access to stored contents can reveal
the complete details of communications over a period of years. The ability to
store everything makes storage the greater privacy threat. Real-time
surveillance becomes only a slice of the world that access to stored contents
can produce.
The surprising rarity of investigative real-time wiretapping for Internet
communications helps confirm the point. Federal law requires the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to publish an annual wiretapping report
that discloses the number and type of wiretapping orders obtained pursuant
to state and federal wiretap statutes.114 In 2012, a total of 633 federal wiretap
111 See Subpoena: Philip Markoff’s Facebook Account, SCRIBD, http://www.scribd.com/
fullscreen/88465177?access_key=key-247mvzrfrh1m1azdsoai (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
112 Carioli, supra note 110.
113 See Samantha Felix, This Is How Facebook Is Tracking Your Internet Activity, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-how-facebook-is-tracking-your-Internetactivity-2012-9?op=1 (noting how Facebook uses cookies to both track users and store their
information).
114 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the
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orders were obtained. 115 But here’s a puzzle: astonishingly few wiretap
orders were obtained for Internet communications. The total number of
federal wiretaps obtained to intercept “electronic communications”—a
category that includes computer communications, pagers, and fax machines—was three.116 That’s not a typo. In the entire United States, federal
investigators obtained only three Title III orders to obtain Internet communications.117
This does not mean that investigators took a holiday from collecting
evidence over the Internet. Instead, investigators have focused their
attention on collecting stored records. Recent Google Transparency Reports
provide some useful data. In the last six months of 2012, state and federal
investigators in the United States obtained 1896 search warrants for accounts operated by Google (most of which were for the contents of Gmail
accounts).118 In light of current trends, this would mean that Google likely
received about 4000 warrants for the contents of accounts in the year 2012.
And of course Google is only one provider among many. Only a small
percentage of email accounts in the United States are hosted by Google.
To be sure, the changing costs of storage are not the only explanation for
this shift in practices. The increased use of encryption has made real-time–
Internet wiretapping much more difficult than it was previously. Because
services tend to store the contents of communications in plaintext even if
they send communications in ciphertext, the government naturally will try to
collect the communications when they are stored rather than in transit.119 In
addition, the investigative focus on stored communications partially reflects
the lower statutory threshold for access to stored communications. A

Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communication, ( 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/WiretapReports/wiretap-report-2012.aspx (providing the annual report online).
115 Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on Applications for
Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communication, ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, at tbl.6 ( J une 2013), http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2012/Table6.pdf.
116 Id.
117 Another federal order was obtained that included some combination of telephone surveillance, Internet surveillance, and physical bugging, although the report does not disclose how many
of those included Internet surveillance. Id.
118 Transparency Report: United States, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
userdatarequests/US (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
119 See Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why Encryption Drives the
Government to Seek Access to the Cloud 7 (Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies at the
Moritz College of Law, Working Paper No. 175, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
id=2038871 (noting that logistical and technical issues are driving the emphasis on stored
communication).
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standard search warrant is sufficient to compel a provider to disclose stored
contents, while real-time surveillance requires a Title III “super warrant”
that is substantially harder to obtain.120 But the difference also reflects the
reality that stored access is a more than adequate substitute in most investigations. The low cost of storage ensures that stored access generally produces the same level of detail as real-time surveillance. As a result,
technological change has reversed the assumptions of the 1986 statute.
B. ECS Versus RCS and the Limited Coverage of the SCA
The second fundamental dichotomy in ECPA is the distinction between
providers of electronic communication service and remote computing
service. In 1986, this reflected the two primary ways that users stored files
on computer networks.121 The ECS protections covered email; the RCS
protections covered contents of communications transmitted for remote
storage and processing by services available to the public. The SCA does
not protect any other kinds of contents because they fall out of the two
kinds of network services that were common in 1986.122
This approach is obsolete today for two reasons. First, it likely leaves
unprotected perhaps the most private kinds of communications sent by
modern Internet users: search requests. Search engines did not exist in 1986
because there was no web to search; the World Wide Web had not yet been
invented.123 Today, however, we send our most private thoughts to Google
and other search engines to explore our questions, hopes, fears, and dreams.
According to one study, search engines analyzed about 18.4 billion search
requests from the United States in March of 2012 alone.124 That is about
two searches a day per person in the United States, or more than 650
searches per year. Search engines store all of those requests, often for
120
121
122

See id. (indicating the trend of increasing numbers over time).
See supra Section I.B.
See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 (2004) (outlining areas of coverage limitation for
the SCA).
123 Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 1990, and the first browser was introduced in 1994. See TIM BERNERS-LEE & MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE
ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 69 (1999); see also
NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 17
(2008) (describing the introduction of the mosaic browser and the intention of gearing toward
maximizing the number of users).
124 See, e.g., ComScore Releases March 2012 U.S. Search Engine Rankings, COMSCORE (Apr. 11,
2012),
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/4/comScore_Releases_March_
2012_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings (displaying the total searches in February and March of
2012).
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months or even years. For example, Google presently stores search queries
for 18 months, and previously stored them for 24 months.125
ECPA likely offers no protection for access to stored search queries,
however, because it does not fit the 1986 dichotomies codified by the
statute. Search engines plainly do not provide ECS as they are destinations
for communications, not providers of connectivity or messaging.126 And
search queries do not appear to be protected under the RCS rules either. A
remote computing service is defined as a service that provides the public
“computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”127 Users do not send their search queries to Google in
order for the site to store them. Storage is a bug for users, not a feature.
The question of whether ECPA protects search queries therefore hinges
on whether search engines “process” data that users send them. The relevant text and legislative history suggests that they do not. In the context of
computer data, the word “process” suggests performing operations on that
data rather than responding to a query. The legislative history makes the
context clear: remote processing meant the outsourcing of tasks, such as
number-crunching, that a computer of the 1980s might not be able to
complete easily.128 Search engines do not seem to fit that mold. Individuals
do not use search engines as substitutes for the storage or processing powers
of their own machines. Although the issue is difficult and not free from

125 Thomas Crampton, Google to Cut Back on How Long It Keeps Search History, N.Y. TIMES
( J une 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-google.4.
6113031.html?_r=0.
126 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006) defines an ECS as “any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” This limits ECS
providers to providers of connectivity or messaging of covered wire or electronic communications.
127 Id. § 2711(2).
128 The Senate Report accompanying the passage of ECPA offered the following explanation
of the concept of a “remote computing service”:

In the age of rapid computerization, a basic choice has faced the users of computer
technology. That is, whether to process data in-house on the user’s own computer or
on someone else’s equipment. Over the years, remote computer service companies
have developed to provide sophisticated and convenient computing services to subscribers and customers from remote facilities. Today businesses of all sizes—
hospitals, banks and many others—use remote computing services for computer processing. This processing can be done with the customer or subscriber using the facilities of the remote computing service in essentially a time-sharing arrangement, or it
can be accomplished by the service provider on the basis of information supplied by
the subscriber or customer.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, 10-11 (1986).
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doubt,129 it appears likely that the most private of today’s communications
receive no statutory protection from ECPA.
A second problem with the ECS–RCS dichotomy is that today’s Internet services are routinely multifunctional. In 1986, users accessed the
Internet by connecting to mainframe computers that gave users access to
the network and an email account.130 In the language of ECPA, they were
ECS providers that gave users access to services that included RCS providers. Today, however, users connect to the Internet in many different ways,
including broadband and wireless accounts. Network access is always
present, running in the background rather than acting as a conscious user
destination.131 At the same time, content messaging such as email or text
messaging is simply one service available among many bundled together.
Take the example of Facebook.132 Facebook is not just an email service.
Rather, Facebook offers an amalgam of many different kinds of services,
including email, chat, photograph hosting, search functions, and bulletin
board services.
The multifunctional nature of modern Internet services creates headaches for ECPA by raising complex and perhaps unanswerable questions
about what the statute protects. ECPA’s privacy protections hinge on the
status of the provider. Given that providers wear multiple hats, multiple
privacy protections may apply to records. Imagine that a provider acts as an
ECS for one set of communications, an RCS for another, and neither an
ECS nor an RCS for a third. What privacy protections should apply when
the government seeks the disclosure of records under the statute? If the
government is seeking noncontent records, the current statute offers
129 At least one major search engine, Google, claims to be covered by the SCA on the ground
that it provides RCS. In litigation over the disclosure of Google search queries, Google argued
that its services are protected by the SCA:

Google processes search requests as directed by, and for, its users who in turn retrieve the search results of their choosing from Google's index, or Google sends the
results by email or text messages to individuals, to wireless phones or other designated mobile devices. Said in plain language, users rely on the remote computer facilities of Google to process and store their search requests and to retrieve by elecelectronic transmission their search results.
Google’s Opp’n to the Gov’t's Motion to Compel at 12, Gonzales v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 06-80006), 2006 WL 543697, at *12 (citation omitted).
130 It was also during this time that personal computers began to make gains on the mainframe-computing model. See CARR, supra note 1233, at 54-55 (describing the increased acceptance
of the personal computer as a business tool).
131 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1314
(2012) (describing the “always on” nature of modern communications devices).
132 See FACEBOOK, http://facebook.com. As if any cite were necessary.
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conflicting answers depending on what service are provided for those sets of
records.133 The old dichotomies don’t fit today’s technological practices.
C. Content Versus Noncontent Metadata
The next dichotomy in ECPA is the distinction between the contents of
communications and noncontent metadata. When ECPA was first enacted,
the statute focused on providing statutory protections for contents. The
scope of Fourth Amendment protection for such contents was unclear.134
Statutory protections guaranteed privacy if the Fourth Amendment protections did not materialize or at least until they did so. In contrast, ECPA’s
protections for noncontent information were an afterthought.135 Although
later amendments paid more attention to privacy concerns in noncontent
records, the statute maintains its focus on protecting contents.
Such a focus may no longer make sense for two complementary reasons.
First, changing technology has rendered metadata analysis more important.
The capacity of computers to efficiently analyze metadata has made metadata surveillance more significant than it was in the past. The line between
contents and metadata remains fundamental,136 but metadata analysis has
become a more powerful tool than before. Metadata analysis has also
133 For example, imagine a company employee logs into the company server to write an
email and view a stored document. The government wants records from the company about the
employee’s conduct. If the government is seeking those records from the company in its capacity
as an email provider—that is, as a provider of ECS—then it needs a 2703(d) order to compel the
noncontent records. But if the government is seeking those same records from the company in its
capacity as a private company that has log-in records about accessing the stored file, then ECPA
does not apply at all: The provider is not an ECS because it is not providing email service with
respect to that file and cannot be a provider of RCS because its services are not available to the
public. Whether the statute applies depends on the metaphysical question of whether you see the
records as relating to the email or the stored file.
134 See OTA REPORT, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s protections
have not kept pace with technological advances). The only significant decision applying the
Fourth Amendment to computer networks before the late 1990s was United States v. Horowitz, 806
F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1986), which was handed down a few months after ECPA’s adoption. Further,
Horowitz was more interesting for the issues it raised than the issues it answered. The defendant
had sent information electronically to a customer, and the government recovered the information
from the customer’s server. Id. at 1224. The Fourth Circuit had no problem concluding that the
defendant did not have Fourth Amendment rights in the data he had sent to the customer and
that was available on the customer’s computer. See id. at 1225-26.
135 See supra Part I.C.
136 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1019-22, 1034-35 (2010) (“To apply the Fourth Amendment to the Internet in
a technologically neutral way, access to the contents of communications should be treated like
access to evidence located inside. . . . [and] access to noncontent information should be treated
like access to evidence found outside.”).
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become comparatively important with the rise of encryption.137 Internet
services that generate metadata possess it in unencrypted form. Encryption
that might complicate or entirely thwart content surveillance may still leave
metadata available for government analysis.138
Second, changing law may render the content protections of ECPA
much less important. In the last few years, several lower courts have ruled
that the Fourth Amendment fully protects the contents of emails held by
third party providers. The leading case is United States v. Warshak, a Sixth
Circuit decision by Judge Boggs involving government access to emails held
by the defendant’s Internet service provider.139 Investigators relied on a
provision of the SCA to subpoena the defendant’s Internet service provider
for the contents of stored emails relating to a massive fraud scheme.140 The
provider complied and gave investigators copies of thousands of email
messages without a warrant. The Sixth Circuit held that obtaining the
contents of emails without a warrant was unconstitutional: users have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their emails just like their letters and
phone calls.141 As a result, the provision of the SCA permitting the government to obtain emails with less process than a warrant was unconstitutional.142
Several courts have agreed with the Sixth Circuit since Warshak, including federal courts in Kansas143 and the District of Columbia,144 and the state
of Washington Court of Appeals.145 Other courts have applied Warshak to
137 See generally Swire, supra note 119 (connecting technology changes to changes in surveillance practices).
138 I use the term “may” because the details depend on complex questions of what is defined
as contents and what is defined as metadata. See Kerr, Internetsupra note 66, at 646 n.190
(describing the confusion surrounding whether certain metadata constitutes “content” or
“addressing information” for Fourth Amendment purposes).
139 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
140 Id. at 281-83.
141 Id. at 285-86.
142 Id. at 288 (“[T]o the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain
such emails warrantlessly, [that portion of] the SCA is unconstitutional.”).
143 In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address,
2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (“The Court finds the rationale set forth in
Warshak persuasive and therefore holds that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in emails or faxes stored with, sent to, or received through an electronic communications service
provider.”).
144 United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012) (recognizing a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of emails).
145 See State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 483 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (“While Warshak does not
aid Hinton, its comparison of emails with traditional forms of communication is helpful and we
adopt it to hold that text messages deserve privacy protection similar to that provided for
letters.”).
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find a reasonable expectation of privacy in stored Facebook messages,146 text
messages,147 faxes,148 and password-protected websites.149 Moreover, multiple courts have presumed Fourth Amendment protection in emails. In
evaluating the lawfulness of warrants obtained to collect emails pursuant to
Section 2703(a) of ECPA, those courts have mostly not even paused to
consider whether the communications might be unprotected.150 In contrast,
no court has reached the contrary result. Warshak has been adopted by every
court that has squarely decided the question. The case law is not entirely
settled, as only one federal court of appeals has squarely addressed the issue.
But the trend in the case law is to recognize fairly broad Fourth Amendment protection, backed by a warrant requirement, for stored contents such
as emails.
The existence of full constitutional protection for the contents of remotely stored Internet communications significantly lessens the need for
statutory protections that were at the heart of the 1986 statute. In a historical sense, ECPA has served its purpose: Congress intended it as a stopgap
measure designed to impose statutory protections until Fourth Amendment
precedents became established. Now that the courts have stepped in and
begun to regulate government access to stored contents, ECPA’s role can
change. Statutory protections are still needed to regulate nongovernmental
access to contents of communications that the Fourth Amendment will not
reach.151 But recent Fourth Amendment rulings suggest that the focus of the
statute can turn more to noncontent information, such as logs and IP
addresses that remain outside the Fourth Amendment.152
Granted, the constitutional protections remain tentative and the Supreme Court has not yet spoken. There is significant value in statutory
146 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1142 (D.
Minn. 2012) (“The Court agrees that one cannot distinguish a password-protected private
Facebook message from other forms of private electronic correspondence.”).
147 See Hinton, 280 P.3d at 483.email
148 In re Applications for Search Warrants, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5.
149 United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121-22 (D. Mass. 2007).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); United
States v. Cioffi, 668 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. McDarrah, 2006 WL
1997638, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006), aff’d, 351 F. App’x 558 (2d Cir. 2009). But see In re
Applications for Search Warrants, 2012 WL 4383917, at *3-5 (discussing the Fourth Amendment
question).
151 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (noting that the Fourth Amendment does not regulate private searches).
152 See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that noncontent information such as IP addresses and the to–from information of email addresses is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment).
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protections before the constitutional precedents are clearly established.153 At
the same time, another constitutional development handed down after
ECPA renders its content protections a mixed bag. In Illinois v. Krull, the
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the
police conduct a search in reasonable reliance on statutory authority.154 An
Illinois state statute allowed the police to conduct warrantless inspections of
automobile salvage yard records.155 After the Illinois Supreme Court ruled
the searches pursuant to the statute unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule nonetheless did not apply because the
officers had reasonably relied on the statute authorizing warrantless searches.156
Under Krull, statutory privacy regulations such as ECPA’s protections
for contents of communications cut both ways. Because ECPA’s provisions
do not include a statutory exclusionary rule for either access to stored
communications or the interception of computer communications, criminal
defendants seeking suppression of evidence must rely on the Fourth
Amendment. But Krull complicates efforts to clarify Fourth Amendment
law through suppression motions by allowing courts to deny motions to
suppress under the good-faith exception without resolving how the Fourth
Amendment applies. That largely explains why the Warshak Court is the
only federal circuit court to date that has directly addressed Fourth
Amendment protections in email. Litigation over Fourth Amendment
rights in email rarely reach the merits in light of Krull. 157 Eliminating
content protections under ECPA may paradoxically speed up the process of
establishing the apparent strong constitutional protections.

D. Particularity and Minimization of Internet Communications and Records
The fourth outdated feature of ECPA is the absence of any reference to
particularity or minimization of records obtained beyond the Wiretap Act.
153 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805, 857-87 (2004) (discussing the
“institutional limitations of judicial rulemaking” and the “significant institutional advantage” of
legislatures with respect to the regulation of “criminal investigations involving new technologies”).
154 480 U.S. 340, 342 (1987).
155 Id. at 343.
156 Id. at 355-57.
157 I discussed how the Krull good-faith exception has delayed the case law on the Fourth
Amendment implications of government access to email in Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment
Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United
States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 257 (2011).
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Particularity is a concept from Fourth Amendment law that refers to the
scope of searches and seizures. 158 The Fourth Amendment states that
warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”159 By limiting the scope of searches, the
particularity requirement helps avoid fishing expeditions. For example, it
ensures that searches are directed at a single house rather than a city block
(or entire city), and that they aim to collect specific evidence instead of any
evidence.
Applying the particularity concept to records collected from Internet
providers prompts a difficult question: After the government satisfies the
relevant threshold to obtain records, how many records may the government then collect? This question did not arise when ECPA was drafted
because few records existed to be accessed. At that time, storage was
expensive and detailed records were rare. Companies generally deleted
copies of emails read by users to save space for other messages.160 As a
result, Congress never considered how the particularity standard applied to
records collected from Internet providers. Investigators could not collect
enough records to make particularity an issue, so the statute does not limit
the particularity of orders to obtain information.
The absence of any reference to the particularity of court orders creates
considerable headaches today. Storage has become cheap, and Internet
providers store vast amounts of information by default. As a result, the
scope of records which may be obtained has become vitally important.
Recall the example of the court order to obtain the contents of a single
Facebook account.161 The 72-page report, which the Boston Police Department had collected pursuant to ECPA to solve the case of the so-called
“Craigslist Killer,” reflected every single message, photo, and mouse click
ever associated with the account.162 A single court order disclosed everything to the police as a matter of routine practice without any concern about
the particularity of communications sought.
ECPA is also silent on court orders that seek records regarding hundreds or even thousands of users. A surveillance practice known colloquially
158 See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1987) (stating that the particularity
requirement allows only warrants that offer particular and specific descriptions of places that are to
be searched).
159 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
160 See generally supra Section I.B.
161 See supra notes 42-44.
162 The report is available at http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/88465177?access_key=key247mvzrfrh1m1azdsoai.
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as a “cell tower dump” illustrates the problem.163 Cell phones must maintain
contact with local cellular towers to route communications between the
phones and the phone network.164 As a result, cell phone companies generate records showing which phones are in communication with particular
towers at specific times.165 This so-called “cell-site” data provides a rough
indication of the location of the phone, and thus presumably the location of
its owner. A “cell tower dump” refers to the practice of obtaining records of
all customers whose phones were in contact with a cell tower or group of
towers over a particular period of time when a crime occurred. 166 For
example, if a bank robbery occurred on Main Street at 3 PM, a cell tower
dump might allow the government to obtain records of every cell phone
user whose phone was in contact with towers near Main Street at that time.
In its current form, ECPA says nothing about the particularity of cell
tower dumps. The statutory text merely states that, on a proper showing of
cause, the government may obtain an order “requir[ing] a provider of
electronic communication service . . . to disclose . . . information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service.”167 If the phrase “a
subscriber to or customer of” means that each order must be limited to a
single customer, then ECPA does not allow cell tower dumps at all. But if
ECPA allows court orders for multiple customers—as courts so far have
assumed—then the statute is remarkably tone deaf to the scale of the
privacy invasion.
To see why, imagine a case where the police believe a house was robbed
between noon and 6 PM on a busy city block. Does ECPA allow the police
to obtain records for the entire six-hour window, potentially implicating
thousands of users? And how many towers can the records concern? And
what may the government do with all the data that it obtains, very little of
which is likely to be relevant to the investigation?168
Constitutional doctrine can address the particularity problem in ECPA
within the narrow context of contents already protected by Fourth
Amendment. In one recent case, a magistrate judge refused to issue a search
warrant sought under ECPA for the contents of an email account and a fax

163 See, e.g., In re U.S. ex rel. Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Nos. 12-670, 12-671, 12672, 12-673, 2012 WL 4717778, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012) (noting how the lack of government
protocol on collecting information from cell tower dumps raises privacy issues).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006).
168 See In re U.S. ex rel. Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 2012 WL 4717778, at *4.
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account because the requested warrants were insufficiently particular.169 The
warrant applications asked for “all records and other information regarding
the account”170 including “deleted communications, as well as all records and
information regarding identification of the email or fax account, and other
information stored by the account user, including address books, contact
lists, calendar data, pictures and files.”171
The Magistrate Judge held that such a request for information was “too
broad and too general”172 to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. A warrant for
the entire contents of the account was akin “to a warrant asking the post
office to provide copies of all mail ever sent by or delivered to a certain
address so that the government can open and read all the mail to find out
whether it constitutes fruits, evidence or instrumentality of a crime.” 173
Because the Fourth Amendment would not permit such a warrant for the
post office, it would not “permit a similarly overly broad warrant just
because the information sought is electronic communications versus paper
ones.”174
Although the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement can address
the scope of searches for contents, it cannot serve the same role for noncontent information that is outside the scope of constitutional protection.175
The existing ECPA statute simply fails to address the allowed scope of
records that can be sought under the statute.
E. The Territoriality of ECPA
The final outdated aspect of ECPA is its territorial scope. In 1986, when
the statute was drafted, communication over computer networks occurred
mostly in the United States. Commercial providers such as CompuServe
provided U.S. users with email and bulletin board services reachable by
telephone and modem with U.S. numbers, but international calling rates
made such services all but inaccessible outside the United States.176 The
169 In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address,
2012 WL 4383917, at *10-11 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012).
170 Id. at *8.
171 Id. at *9.
172 Id. at *8.
173 Id. at *9.
174 Id.
175 See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect noncontent information such as IP addresses and the to–
from information of email addresses).
176 The cost of an international telephone call in the 1980s was measured in dollars per minute, making such access out of reach to most users.
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U.S. government had established ARPANET, which eventually morphed
into the Internet,177 but its use was heavily oriented toward users located in
the United States.178 As a result, issues regarding the territorial scope of the
statute did not arise in early debates over ECPA. Congress was instead
focused on the rights of U.S. computer users and U.S. services.
Even today, surprisingly few court decisions have addressed the current
territorial scope of ECPA. Most of the relevant precedents involve the
scope of the Wiretap Act. Courts have held that the telephone wiretapping
provisions of the Wiretap Act only apply to interceptions inside the United
States.179 Courts have justified this territorial limit on two grounds. The
first ground is “the canon of construction which teaches that, unless a
contrary intent appears, federal statutes apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.”180 The second ground is that the Wiretap
Act provides only for U.S. courts issuing wiretap orders in their jurisdictions, which suggests that Congress intended to limit the territorial scope of
the Act to the United States.181 As a result, the Wiretap Act does not
regulate any interceptions occurring outside U.S. borders.
The sole precedent on the territorial scope of the Stored Communications Act provisions of ECPA is a single unpublished district court decision,
Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc.182 In that case, political activists in China claimed that
the Chinese government had tortured and detained them after Yahoo!’s
Chinese affiliate “Yahoo! China” had disclosed identifying information
about them to the Chinese government. 183 The district court rejected
plaintiffs’ claim that the disclosure violated ECPA on the ground that
ECPA does not apply to disclosures outside the United States.184 In reaching
177
178

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997).
By the time Reno went to trial, sixty percent of Internet servers were located in the United States. Id. at 850.
179 See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Wiretap Act “has no extraterritorial force”); U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1974)
( f inding that the “federal statute governing wiretapping and eavesdropping has no application
outside the United States” (citation omitted)).
180 United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1975).
181 Id. As noted by the district court in United States v. Angulo-Hurtado,
Congress intended Title III to protect the integrity of United States communications systems against unauthorized interceptions taking place in the United States. If
Congress had meant to require law enforcement agencies to satisfy Title III for interceptions conducted outside the United States, it would have provided some
mechanism by which agents could obtain such approval. Congress did not do so.
165 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
182 No. 08-1068, 2009 WL 4430297 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009).
183 Id. at *1.
184 Id. at *4.
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its decision, the court relied heavily on the reasoning of the cases interpreting the territoriality of the Wiretap Act.185 It also noted that the enactment
of ECPA did not contain any provisions rejecting that traditional territorial
scope.186
Although the territorial scope of ECPA was not the focus of attention
when the statute was passed, it has since become tremendously important.
Today’s Internet is truly global. A computer user can access a website across
the world as easily as one across the street. Servers can be located anywhere,
even thousands of miles away from company headquarters. For example,
the servers hosting the most popular Internet poker sites serving players all
around the world are located in a nondescript building on an Indian reservation not far from Montreal, Canada.187 Or at least that is the case today, as
the location could change at any time.
The reality of global access means that U.S.-based Internet services often have a heavily foreign customer base. Consider Gmail, the popular
email service provided by Google. Google is headquartered in California,
but only 30 percent of Gmail’s users reside in the United States.188 This
chart shows the percentage of Gmail’s users that are in a handful of different countries as of September 2013189:

185 Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987); Stowe v.
Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2nd Cir. 1978); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279 (2d Cir.
1974)).
186 See Zhang, 2009 WL 4430297, at *3 (“ECPA did not amend the portion of the Wiretap
Act that made no provision for obtaining authorization for wiretaps in a foreign country, nor did
ECPA, in amending the Wiretap Act and creating the SCA, reference in any manner activities
occurring outside the United States.”).
187 See ‘60 Minutes’ Report: How Online Gamblers Unmasked Cheaters, CNET.COM (Nov. 30,
2008), http://news.cnet.com/60-minutes-report-how-online-gamblers-unmasked-cheaters
(reporting that members of the Mohawk Kahnawake nation register and service “more than 60% of
the world’s Internet gaming activity”).
188 Gmail Usage Per Country, APPAPPEAL.COM, http://www.appappeal.com/maps/gmail (last
visited Nov. 22, 2013).
189 See id.
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United States
India
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Russia
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Iran
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Percentage of Gmail Users
30.0%
8.8%
3.3%
3.2%
2.9%
2.6%
2.4%
1.4%

Facebook’s user base is even more foreign than Gmail’s. To be sure, using Facebook has become as American as apple pie: about 54 percent of
Americans presently have a Facebook account.190 At the same time, only
about 16 percent of Facebook’s users are located in the United States.191 The
rest access Facebook from abroad. For U.S.-based services like Gmail and
Facebook, U.S. users form only a small subset of its overall global customer
base.
The friction between the territorial ECPA and the global Internet creates two major puzzles that ECPA’s drafters could not have foreseen. First,
what does it mean for ECPA to apply only inside the territory of the
United States? In today’s networked environment, company headquarters
can be located in one country; employees with access to the data can be
located in a second country; the data can reside in a third country; and the
party seeking access to the company’s data could be located in a fourth
country. Of course, all of the data could be easily sent electronically from
any place in the world to any other place. So what determines territoriality?
The location of the data? The company? The employee? Or the requesting
party? 192 Imagine a person in Mexico who seeks the emails of another
person in Mexico, and he does so by contacting employees in France who
work for an Internet company headquartered in Belgium that hosts its
190 Quentin Fottrell, Facebook Loses 1.4 Million Active Users in U.S., MARKETWATCH ( J an.
15, 2013), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-01-15/finance/36346107_1_active-users-facebooksocial-media.
191 Id. (reporting that about 167 million of Facebook’s one billion users are located in the
United States as of January 2013).
192 Courts have encountered similar questions while identifying the location of an intercept
under the Wiretap Act for purposes of obtaining a wiretap order in a particular district. See
United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a judge in Wisconsin was
statutorily authorized to order a wiretap on a cellular phone regardless of whether the phone or
listening post was located in Wisconsin).
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servers in the United States. If the company discloses the records, is that
disclosure inside the United States for purposes of ECPA? Does it matter if
the French employees first have the data emailed to them and then disclose
the communications from France to Mexico? ECPA offers no answers to
such questions.
Indeed, the very idea of online data being located in a particular physical
“place” is becoming rapidly outdated. From the standpoint of network
design, a person’s email files could be fragmented and the underlying data
located in many places around the world.193 The emails could only exist in
recognizable form when they are assembled remotely. That assembly could
occur anywhere at the direction of someone who could be located anywhere
else. If the location of the stored data governs under ECPA, what is the
location of emails that were stored in fragments all around the world?
A second puzzle created by the mismatch of the territorial statute and
the global Internet is how the statute deals with foreign government access.
The frequency by which services like Gmail are used by individuals outside
the United States explains why foreign governments often seek access to
records or contents held by U.S.-based service providers concerning
individuals abroad. Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Suzlon Energy Ltd.
v. Microsoft Corp., 194 the location of the customer or subscriber has no
bearing on that individual’s ECPA rights.195 Individuals outside the United
States who use Gmail from abroad have the same statutory rights as U.S.
citizens using the service from inside the United States.
At the same time, foreign governments often believe that their local
priorities and local laws should control. For example, in 2007, prosecutors in
Belgium brought criminal charges against the U.S.-based provider Yahoo!
for its failure to disclose records sought about customers in the Netherlands
whom Belgian prosecutors suspected of criminal activity. 196 Yahoo!’s

193 Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of SelfIncrimination in the Digital Era, 15 U. PA. J. CON. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 11, 20-21 (2012) (“Google
Docs or Amazon’s cloud-based simple storage service . . . might sometimes choose to store
multiple copies of a document, or to partition a single copy of the document into separately stored
fragments.”).
194 671 F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he plain language of ECPA extends its protections
to noncitizens. The Court is therefore obligated to enforce the statute as written.”).
195 Id. at 729-30.
196 Tanguy Van Overstraeten & Ronan Tigner, Belgium–Yahoo! Saga Continues: Yahoo! Must
Not Hand Over Personal Data to the Public Prosecutor, LINKLATERS ( J an. 30, 2012),
http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1403Newsletter/TMT-Newsletter-January2012/Pages/9_Belgium-Yahoo!-saga-continues-Yahoo-personal-data-public-prosecutor.aspx (last
visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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defense was based in part on ECPA. According to Yahoo!, it was a U.S.
provider governed by U.S. law. The criminal case against Yahoo! is still
pending in the Belgian courts,197 but the lesson is clear: the global Internet
requires privacy laws that account for the demands of governments around
the world rather than just the United States.
What rules currently apply when a foreign government approaches a
U.S.-based provider and demands information for a foreign investigation
about a foreign user? In its current form, ECPA does not recognize foreign
governments as governments at all. Government entities are defined as
“department[s] or agenc[ies] of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof,”198 thus excluding foreign governments. This means
that foreign governments cannot obtain mandatory process using foreign
court orders.199 Further, the presumptive ban on the disclosure of contents
of communications will apply to disclosure sought by foreign governments
just as it does to disclosure sought by private entities.200 At the same time,
because ECPA permits providers to disclose noncontent information to
nongovernment entities,201 providers can disclose noncontent information
to foreign governments at their discretion. As a practical matter, then,
foreign governments can often obtain noncontent information using foreign
court orders. The providers have a choice to disclose the information or not,
and they may do so in response to a legitimate court order even though the
order is not binding in the United States.
The picture is more complicated when foreign governments seek content information. Four basic options exist. The first option is for foreign
governments to work with the U.S. government and to use Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties or letters rogatory to seek information from providers
using official diplomatic channels.202 This process generally remains slow
and laborious, as it requires the cooperation of two governments and one of
those governments may not prioritize the case as highly as the other.203
A second option is for foreign governments to persuade U.S. officials to
open a domestic investigation and obtain U.S. court orders that are binding
197
198
199
200

Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4) (2006).
See id. § 2703 (providing means of compelling information for government entities).
See id. § 2702(a)–(b) (drawing no distinction between private entities and foreign governments for purposes of limiting the voluntary disclosures of customer communications by
providers).
201 See id. § 2702(c)(6) (permitting disclosure of noncontent information “to any person
other than a governmental entity”).
202 See generally ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 752-59 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing
the legal regime for letters rogatory and mutual legal assistance in computer crime cases).
203 Id.
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in the United States. Domestic officials can then turn over the fruits of the
court orders to the foreign authorities. The procedure can be very quick, but
it requires the foreign crime to also be a U.S. offense.204 Further, it requires
U.S. investigative authorities to approve of the investigation and consider it
a sufficient priority (either to further its own interests or to advance comity
interests in cooperation) to merit the use of U.S. resources.
The third option is that a provider could design the network so that a
copy of the communication exists outside the United States where ECPA
does not apply. For example, the provider could create a policy by which
users who register their accounts from outside the United States have copies
of their accounts stored outside the United States as a matter of course. If
foreign governments approach the provider seeking to obtain the communications, the copy will already exist outside the United States. It seems likely
that ECPA would not apply, and the communication can be accessed under
the laws of the country in which the copy is retained.
The fourth option is legally dubious but nonetheless worth mentioning:
a provider might store the communications in the United States and then
export the data to a representative or an affiliate outside the United States
when foreign legal process is served. As soon as the data is outside the
United States, the representative or affiliate can disclose the data under the
rationale that the disclosure is no longer inside the United States and
therefore no longer regulated by ECPA. This option is likely unlawful
because it merely breaks the unlawful disclosure into two steps. It would be
surprising if providers could circumvent ECPA’s territorial limits on
disclosing contents without a court order by first emailing it to a corporate
representative abroad. There are no decisions on the issue, however, and the
distinction between designing a network so that copies are abroad to
facilitate legal process and simply sending a copy abroad in response to legal
process is a tricky one. ECPA simply was not written with the territoriality
problem in mind.

204 Notably, U.S. criminal laws have been expanded extraterritorially to enable U.S. assistance to foreign governments. By making a foreign crime also a crime inside the United States,
investigators in the United States can open a domestic investigation and assist foreign governments when evidence happens to be located inside the United States. See Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), Field Guidance on New Authorities that Relate to Computer
Crime and Electronic Evidence Enacted in the USA Patriot Act of 2001, CYBERCRIME.GOV (Nov. 5,
2001), http://web.archive.org/web/20011204213823/ (discussing the extraterritorial expansion of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a way to assist foreign computer crime investigations).
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III. CRAFTING A NEXT GENERATION PRIVACY ACT
If Congress could start from scratch and enact a new privacy statute,
what would that statute look like? This Part argues that a new privacy
statute should be based on four principles. First, Congress should impose a
uniform requirement for compelled access to remotely stored contents held
for a customer or subscriber. Second, Congress should create a particularity
requirement for compelled access to noncontent information. Third,
Congress should impose minimization rules on all contents of communications obtained by investigators. And fourth, Congress should impose a
territoriality regime based on the location of the user, such as one that
provides full protections for users based in the United States and a permissive regime of disclosure to foreign legal process for users based abroad.
A. Congress Should Enact a Uniform Requirement for Access to Any Remotely
Stored Contents Held by or for a Customer or Subscriber
The first principle of the new statute should be the imposition of a uniform set of rules to govern access to contents held by or for a customer or
subscriber. The core theme animating the electronic privacy statute is the
problem of third party control. Users of computer networks necessarily
place information in the control of others. The new statute should confer a
single legal standard for access to the contents of data held by or for a
customer or subscriber.
This approach would abolish the existing distinctions between protections against real-time access, currently covered by the Wiretap Act, and
the regulation of stored access, which is presently covered by the Stored
Communications Act. As explained in Part II, the low storage cost of
electronic information has led to a convergence between the privacy
implications of real-time and stored access. The new statute should treat
them in the same way and impose the same standard on them. Eliminating
the distinction between real-time and stored access is also more practical
because the distinction is famously difficult to apply for computer and
Internet communications. Courts have struggled to articulate just how
quickly and how often access needs to occur for the court to treat it as
“contemporaneous” and therefore analyze it under the Wiretap Act. 205
Under my proposed approach, this metaphysical line would be eliminated.
My approach also eliminates the existing ECS/RCS distinction and imposes a uniform standard for all providers. All third-party storage of
205

See LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 4.6(b).
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communications should lead to the same protection, regardless of whether
the provider acts as an email host, a cloud provider, or a search engine. The
problem of third-party storage is a general one. In all of these cases, a user
shares the contents of their private communications with a third-party
service that is not the intended human recipient of the message. In all of
these settings, users should receive the same privacy protections against
disclosure by the third-party services about their communications. All
providers should be covered by the same rule. At the very least, the presumption should be that the same level of privacy protection applies
regardless of the means of access. Deviations from that norm should require
significant justification.
Of course, harmonization requires identifying the uniform standard by
which contents would be obtained. Standards might be harmonized up,
harmonized down, or harmonized somewhere in the middle. I have argued
elsewhere that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a probable cause
warrant for government-compelled access to contents, 206 and that the
traditional Fourth Amendment standard provides one natural starting
point. The “super warrant” standard imposed for real-time wiretapping
confers the highest statutory protection under criminal surveillance laws
and provides a second possible point of reference.207 Because this Article is
a thought experiment, I will not attempt to answer where the line should be
drawn. Wherever the line is drawn, existing technology counsels in favor of
a uniform standard for compelled access to contents.
B. Particularity Requirements for Noncontent Data Should Be Imposed, Perhaps
Based on a Concept of Customer-hours
The second principle of the new statute should be the adoption of particularity requirements. Outside of the Wiretap Act, ECPA pays no
attention to particularity because few records existed that could be collected
when the statute was enacted. The amount of data available was sufficiently
limited that scale played little role. That is no longer true. Today the
default has become that all data is stored. As a result, the threshold question
of how much cause the government must demonstrate to obtain information
206 See Kerr, Internetsupra note 136, at 1029-31 (arguing that contents are the online equivalent of real-world “inside” information, and should therefore be covered by the Fourth Amendment).
207 See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56
ALA. L. REV. 9, 80-84 (2004) (arguing that Internet surveillance should adopt the highly
protective standards of the Wiretap Act).
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should be followed by a second question of how much information can be
obtained when that cause has been established.
It helps to divide the proper approach to particularity into two parts:
contents and noncontent information. In the case of contents, the Constitution already requires the government to satisfy traditional Fourth Amendment particularity concerns.208 Although statutory particularity could be
imposed, the Fourth Amendment protections already exist and should serve
that function. The harder question, and the one that is more important for
purposes of a new statute, is what kind of particularity requirement the law
should impose for noncontent information, which is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.209
Identifying the proper particularity standard for noncontent information
is difficult because such records exist in many different forms. Some
noncontent records are more sensitive than others. A list of every email
address that a person emailed, together with the time each email was sent, is
more sensitive than merely the name on the account. Further, as the
example of cell tower dumps reveals, investigators often want records from
many different users at once. As a result, particularity might impose limits
on the number or type of records the government may request from a
particular user or from a range of users. The question is, what principle
should Congress use to limit the scope of noncontent records access? Should
it be the overall number of records collected, perhaps with limitations on
the number of records obtained per order? Or perhaps limitations should be
imposed based on the number of accounts obtained?
There is no perfect answer to this question. However, one approach to
particularity worth considering for noncontent information is the concept of
customer-hours. In an environment of widespread and detailed recordkeeping, a helpful way to measure the scope of access to metadata is by identifying the length of time for which a customer used the service. If providers
collect everything, the time over which the collection occurs most effectively identifies the scope of the metadata collected. Further, if the government
may need the records of multiple users, the invasion of privacy grows with
the number of users whose records are collected. Imposing a particularity
requirement based on a defined maximum number of customer-hours may
provide the best way to limit the scope of noncontent records accessed.
208 See, e.g., In re Applications for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email
Address, Nos. 12-8119, 12--8191, 2012 WL 4383917, at *4-5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (applying
Fourth Amendment protections to emails and faxes). Of course, Congress could enforce a
particularity limit that is more restrictive than the constitutional limit.
209 See supra Section I.C.
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An illustration can help explain how such a particularity requirement
would work. Imagine that Congress sets the threshold for access to noncontent records using a standard akin to the existing 2703(d) standard: to obtain
a court order for disclosure, the government must present “specific and
articulable facts” suggesting that the records disclosed would be “relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”210 Congress could then
impose a particularity limit of a specific number of customer-hours for each
court order. Imagine that a single order is capped at 500 customer-hours. If
the government satisfies the threshold showing of cause, it can obtain all the
noncontent records for a single user for 500 hours, the equivalent of about
21 days. Alternatively, the government could ask for the records of two
customers for 250 hours each, or five users for 100 hours each. We can also
apply this approach in the context of a cell tower dump. A cell tower dump
might reveal records from 1000 customers. In that case, the particularity
limitation of 500 customer-hours would restrict the government’s access to
30 minutes of time. If the government sought information from more
towers, or chose towers with especially high usage, the government could
still obtain the order, but only for an even shorter time window.211
C. Minimization Rules Should Apply to All Obtained
Contents of Communications
The next principle that the new statute should reflect is that minimization principles from the Wiretap Act should apply when accessing all
contents. Existing law adopts a bifurcated privacy regime. Under the
Wiretap Act, lawful access to communications comes with strings attached.212 Even after obtaining a lawful wiretap order, agents are required to
screen communications ex ante and then carefully limit disclosure ex post.213
Under the SCA, a court order requires the provider to supply the government with the entire contents of the account. The government is then free
to look through all of this material.
This was understandable back when few Internet communications were
stored. But in a world of total storage, the absence of legal rules on minimization has become an anomaly. Every collection of contents should impose
210
211

18 U.S.C § 2703(d) (2006).
Of course, there could be implementation issues with this standard if the number of individuals involved were unknown or varied considerably over time. Nonetheless, the customer-hours
approach offers at least a rough way to impose a particularity requirement.
212 See supra Section I.B.
213 See supra Section I.B.
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the same minimization requirements regardless of whether they involve
access to real-time or stored communications. Importantly, the concept of
minimization need not mirror its application in the telephone setting. Here,
the Senate Report accompanying ECPA was remarkably prescient. In the
course of explaining how the minimization requirement might apply to
wiretaps of computer communications, the report states:
It is impossible to “listen” to a computer and determine when to stop listening and minimize as it is possible to do in listening to a telephone conversation. For instance, a page displayed on a screen during a computer
transmission might have five paragraphs of which the second and third are
relevant to the investigation and the others are not. The printing technology is such that the whole page including the irrelevant paragraphs, would
have to be printed and read, before anything can be done about minimization.
Thus, minimization for computer transmissions would require a somewhat
different procedure than that used to minimize a telephone call. Common
sense would dictate, and it is the Committee’s intention, that the minimization should be conducted by the initial law enforcement officials who review
the transcript. Those officials would delete all non-relevant materials and
disseminate to other officials only that information which is relevant to the
investigation.214

As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, minimization for electronic communications requires filtering.215 Someone must go through the records and
find the pertinent communications. The details of how minimization should
be performed are not my focus here, but some kind of minimization standard should apply to the review of protected contents.216

214
215

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 31 (1986).
See United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We interpret Congress’s ‘common sense’ idea of electronic minimization to mean that law enforcement in some
circumstances may look at every communication. Congress intended that the pool of investigative
material be filtered.”).
216 I have argued elsewhere that the plain view exception should not apply to digital evidence
searches, including searches through contents of communications obtained from third-party
providers. See Kerr, Internetsupra note 136, at 1047-48 (“I would incorporate a proposal I have made
in the context of stand-alone computers to eliminate the plain view exception for Internet
searches.”). I continue to adhere to that view, although I will not repeat the argument here.
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D. Congress Could Establish a Two-Part User-Based Regime for Territoriality
The fourth and final principle of a next generation privacy act would be
the establishment of an explicit regime for the territoriality of the statute
and the mechanisms for foreign government access. Congress could do this
in several ways. The many options reflect the several major variables that
govern territoriality, including the location of the information, the location
of the user, and the location of the company that hosts the information.
Further, Congress must decide how to treat foreign government access.
Congress could allow U.S.-based companies to disclose communications or
records pursuant to foreign government orders, or it could require governments to comply with Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties instead. Alternatively, Congress could regulate territoriality by adopting express rules as to
when providers can or must design their networks in ways that go outside
U.S. territory to subject communications to foreign government access.
Based on existing technology, the best available option is to focus privacy protections on the perceived location of the user. Providers usually have
a rough sense of the locations of their customers.217 Users often can select a
language, and they also reveal IP addresses every time they access a provider’s services. IP addresses can be manipulated, of course, but it is often
possible to gauge the rough location of a user from the IP address used to
access the network.218 The combination of language and IP address gives
providers a general sense of the country used to access their network by
each customer.219
A rule based on the location of the user is far from ideal. Some customers access services from multiple countries.220 Others access services using
anonymized IP addresses, making their location difficult to identify.
Nonetheless, providers generally can separate out at least most of their
U.S.-based customers from customers in other countries. And if user
location can be difficult to identify, the remaining options seem worse. In a
217 See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of
Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567, 586-99 (2012) (discussing how
geolocation tools, which currently use IP addresses, can be used to determine an Internet user’s
physical location).
218 See id. at 594-97 (examining the reliability of IP addresses for geolocation).
219 See id. at 597 (explaining that “combinations of methods” yield more accurate results than
relying on IP addresses alone).
220 For example, a user might travel around the world, accessing the network from various
places. In that case, it may be difficult or impossible to definitively associate the person with a
particular home country. At the same time, the use of defaults may solve this problem. For
example, the law could presume that a user of a U.S.-based service is located in the United States
unless the evidence indicates otherwise with some clarity.
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global network, the location of data is arbitrary and increasingly unknowable. The location of the company holding data is equally arbitrary and
difficult to know, given that multinational companies can have affiliates and
branches anywhere. A standard based on perceived user location is problematic, but it seems less problematic than the alternatives.
Moreover, difficulties in identifying location can be addressed through
presumptions and standards of proof. For example, the default rule might
be that a person is presumed to be inside the United States unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the user is outside the United States.
The standard could also incorporate a time element, looking to the person’s
location over the previous month or year to determine where the person is
located. None of these standards would be perfect, but they may provide a
way to implement a location-based standard in a way that makes such an
approach better than the alternatives.
Focusing on user location could enable a two-part solution to the territoriality problem along the following lines. First, Internet providers that are
either based in the United States or that are doing business in the United
States would be required to follow U.S. privacy law with respect to their
U.S.-based users. That requirement would apply regardless of where
information is technically stored. Under my proposal, privacy protections
should follow the user instead of the data: all state or federal government
access to information about U.S.-based users should comply with U.S. law.
So long as a company with a presence in the United States has communications belonging to U.S.-based customers, that company should have to
follow U.S. law imposing a warrant requirement on access. Internet providers in the United States would therefore be free to design their network to
optimize the engineering problem of storage and service without worrying
about the implications for the privacy of their U.S.-based users. Users in
the United States would also know that their use of U.S.-based services
would receive the full protection of U.S. law.
The second part of the solution would focus on the rights of users based
outside of the United States. For those users, the law should allow, but not
require, Internet providers to disclose contents and noncontent information
pursuant to the foreign legal process in the country associated with the user.
If French authorities in France produce a valid court order pertaining to a
French user, U.S.-based providers should be permitted to comply with the
order. This approach would place some burden on providers that service
foreign customers, as it would require them to learn enough about foreign
legal process to understand foreign court orders. More importantly, however, disclosure would be permissive rather than mandatory. Providers that
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chose not to comply with foreign court orders would not be required to do
so, allowing providers to opt out of foreign disclosure if they wished.
Enacting a regime of permissive disclosure for foreign legal process pertaining to foreign users provides important flexibility given the wide range
of different legal standards and foreign governments. If disclosure were
made mandatory, a totalitarian government with no privacy laws could force
U.S.-based providers to disclose contents pertaining to democratic activists
and critics of the regime. On the other hand, if disclosure were forbidden,
even democratic governments with highly protective privacy laws would be
forced to always go through cumbersome legal processes such as letters
rogatory and MLATs to obtain records in routine cases.
A permissive regime would allow U.S.-based providers to choose which
countries should be deemed sufficiently protective and democratic to have
their legal process honored.221 And because that legal process would only
apply to users located in the country where the user is located, the law
would both protect U.S.-based users and permit providers to be confident
that they were disclosing foreign records appropriately in each case.
More broadly, a user-focused solution to territoriality recognizes the
inherently global nature of today’s Internet. It no longer makes sense to
think of data as being in a particular “place” given that data can be sent
anywhere or stored in pieces around the world. In contrast, users remain
rooted in the physical world and are governed by the sovereign interests of
the countries in which they are located. Hinging privacy protections on the
location of the user would ensure that users receive the same localized
protections in the cloud that they do in their homes.
CONCLUSION
Congress rarely enacts sweeping reforms. Slow evolutionary change
ruffles fewer feathers than does wholesale revision. If Congress could enact
a new privacy law today, however, the rapid pace of technological change
since 1986 would lead to a rather different set of statutory privacy laws than
those that presently exist. The law would adopt a single uniform standard
for access to contents, focus much more on particularity and minimization,
and deal explicitly with the problem of extraterritoriality.

221 Providers likely would not welcome this choice, as it encourages foreign governments to
pressure them to disclose and requires providers to make difficult calls. It may prove difficult for a
provider to refuse compliance with court orders in countries where that provider has a business
presence.
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Whether or not Congress is able to enact a wholesale revision of the
privacy laws, it should realize that substantial reform will likely be needed
in our lifetimes. The first federal surveillance law was the Communications
Act of 1934. It was replaced by the Wiretap Act 1968, which was supplemented considerably by ECPA in 1986. Since that time, communications
networks have become significantly more important to American life. The
incredible growth of the Internet and its rapid transformation from a toy to
an essential part of daily life has made the accuracy and timeliness of the
electronic privacy laws more important than ever before.
The vital importance of computers and the Internet tasks Congress with
keeping the privacy laws up to date. Today’s Internet has diverged in
profound ways from the Internet that existed when Congress last enacted
major reform. Whether Congress acts in piecemeal fashion or starts from
scratch, the statutory privacy laws should reflect the privacy threats and
government practices of the present instead of the past.

